



**GlobalMUNers Conference  
in New York City  
#GMNYC2026**

# **BACKGROUND GUIDE**

## **Security Council (SC)**



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## Welcome Message

Dear delegates, welcome to the GlobalMuners New York City Conference 2026 (GMNYC 2026). Delegations of the Security Council, you stand at the center of the United Nations' most consequential decision-making body, where diplomacy carries real weight, and words can shape peace or conflict. Choosing to participate in a Model UN reflects an interest in global affairs, a willingness to engage with difficult questions, and a commitment to understanding how international cooperation and diplomacy shape the world.

This forum demands precision, strategic thinking, and a heightened sense of responsibility. Every intervention matters, and every resolution reflects the balance between national interests and collective security. Precisely because of the level of commitment and responsibility this forum demands, the role of the Dais is to guide you through that challenge and make the process both accessible and rewarding. The Dais is here to support you throughout the committee and to make sure this is an enjoyable experience that challenges your knowledge and decision-making skills.

Our job is to keep the debate organized, answer questions about procedure or substance, and ensure a respectful and balanced space where all delegations can participate. If at any point you are unsure about the rules, the flow of debate, or how to move forward, you are encouraged to reach out. We are not only moderating the committee, but also helping you engage confidently, debate effectively, and make the most of your time in the Security Council.



**Olga Saghia Farides Issa De León**  
Presidency



**Hannah Hagira Manallah Kechida**  
Vice-Presidency / Rapporteur

## Committee Overview

### Historical background

The Security Council was established in 1945 in the aftermath of World War II. Its creation came a few months after the establishment of the United Nations, which formally entered into force on 24 October 1945, following the ratification of the Charter by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a majority of the other signatory states. When the international community faced widespread devastation and an urgent need for a durable framework for peace (United Nations, n.d.-b), representatives of fifty states convened at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. The conference culminated in the drafting and signing of the Charter of the United Nations, which laid the legal and institutional foundations of a new international organization designed to prevent the recurrence of large-scale armed conflict (United Nations, n.d.-b).

The Council emerged as the most influential body within the UN system, entrusted with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security worldwide. It is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (What Is the Security Council? | Security Council, n.d.-b). The Security Council convened for the first time on 17 January 1946 at Church House in Westminster, London. Following this initial session, it established its permanent seat at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. Over the years, the Council has also met outside New York, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, as well as in Panama City and Geneva in 1990. (What Is the Security Council? | Security Council, n.d.-b)

### Mandate and Functions

The primary mandate of the Council is to preserve international peace and security. When conflicts escalate, the Security Council may authorize the deployment of personnel to halt violence and facilitate resolution. In exceptional circumstances, it also has the authority to impose sanctions or approve the use of force to reestablish stability. It assesses situations that may constitute threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression, and seeks to address international disputes through diplomatic and peaceful means (Homepage | Security Council, n.d.).

The Council is the body entrusted with upholding global peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The main functions and powers of the Council are:

- to maintain international peace and security under the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
- to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to

- recommend what action should be taken;
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
- to take military action against an aggressor;
- to recommend the admission of new Members;
- to exercise the United Nations' trusteeship functions in “strategic areas.”  
(*Functions and Powers | Security Council*, n.d.)

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach an agreement by peaceful means. When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. (What Is the Security Council? | Security Council, n.d.)

The Council may:

- set forth principles for such an agreement;
- undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases.
- dispatch a mission;
- appoint special envoys; or
- request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures. The Security Council can take action to maintain or restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Sanctions measures, under Article 41, encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force.

Security Council sanctions have taken various forms in pursuit of a variety of goals. In the past, the Council has applied sanctions to support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights, and promote non-proliferation. The measures have ranged from comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions. (*Sanctions | Security Council*, n.d.).

### ***Members, the voting system, and the veto***

The Security Council is composed of fifteen members, reflecting a structure designed to balance continuity with representation. Five of these members are permanent, namely China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each of these states possesses the right of veto, a privilege that stems from their decisive role in the creation of the United Nations and from the political understanding reached in 1945 that they would assume a primary and continuing responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The veto power remains one of the defining institutional features of the Council, shaping both its decision-making dynamics and its political legitimacy within the broader framework of the Organization (Voting System | Security Council, n.d.).

In addition to the permanent members, the Council includes ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. These seats rotate according to established regional groupings to give effect to the principle of equitable geographical representation. When electing non-permanent members, the General Assembly is required to consider not only geographical distribution but also each candidate state’s contribution to the

maintenance of international peace and security and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Although all fifteen members hold one vote, the distinction between permanent and non-permanent membership significantly influences the Council's deliberative and decision-making processes, particularly in matters requiring substantive resolutions (United Nations, n.d.).

***Non-permanent members:***

Bahrain (2027)  
Colombia (2027)  
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2027)  
Denmark (2026)  
Greece (2026)  
Latvia (2027)  
Liberia (2027)  
Pakistan (2026)  
Panama (2026)  
Somalia (2026)

Each member of the Council holds one vote. For procedural questions, a decision is adopted when at least nine members vote in favor. Substantive matters, including the investigation of disputes or the imposition of sanctions, also require at least 9 affirmative votes. (United Nations Charter, art. 24). In addition, these decisions must include the concurrence of all five permanent members, which possess veto authority.

The veto is among the most debated features of the Council. It allows any of the five permanent members to block the adoption of a substantive resolution. However, a permanent member may abstain or be absent without preventing the resolution from passing, provided the required number of affirmative votes is reached. The veto does not apply to procedural matters (*Voting System | Security Council*, n.d.).

## Topic A. The Question Concerning Haiti

### *History, from 1804 to 2021*

To gain a deeper understanding of Haiti's history, it is necessary to view the nation as a territory that has been immersed in an extended historical process. Within this process, different social, political, economic, and external factors have been recurrent elements that have significantly influenced the country's current composition.

This continuous historical process begins with Haiti's independence in 1804, described in *The Black Jacobins* as the only successful slave revolt in history, which led to the creation of the first Black republic and the second independent state in the world (James, 1938). From its very beginning, the new nation was shaped by economic and political pressures imposed by other states (BBC News, 2012). In 1825, for example, France demanded a large financial indemnity in exchange for recognizing Haiti's independence, creating a long-term debt that weakened the country's economy and institutions for generations (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). As a result, Haiti's foundations were fragile from the outset, setting conditions that contributed to repeated crises throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Jaramillo, 2021).

During the modern period (the 19th and early 20th centuries), Haiti experienced repeated political instability, marked by frequent changes in leadership and internal power struggles, such as the assassination of President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam in July 1915 following a violent uprising in Port-au-Prince (Schmidt, 1995). In 1915, the United States occupied Haiti, officially to restore order and protect its interests. The occupation lasted until 1934 and reshaped Haiti's political and security structures, centralizing power while also weakening local governance and leaving a lasting legacy of mistrust toward foreign involvement (Collège de France, 2025).

Further on, Haiti went through persistent cycles of political instability, external interventions, and authoritarian regimes. The second half of the 20th century was dominated by authoritarian rule, most notably the dictatorship of François Duvalier, "Papa Doc," and later his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, "Baby Doc" (1957–1986) (Abbott, 2011). Their regimes relied on repression, corruption, and paramilitary groups to maintain control. State institutions became tools of personal power rather than public service, further weakening governance structures.

When the dictatorship collapsed in 1986, Haiti entered a long period of political transition characterized by fragile elections, coups d'état, political violence, contested elections, and fragile democratic institutions, in which the State's capacity to guarantee effective governance remained limited (Teichner, 2024). In this context, the international community began to become more actively involved in the country's internal affairs, particularly from the 1990s onward, when the United Nations Security Council authorized missions aimed at restoring constitutional order (Joseph & Beal, 2023).

Haiti's vulnerability has been further affected by its geographic and environmental exposure. As a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), Haiti faces high risks from natural disasters and climate-related events. The devastating 2010 earthquake caused catastrophic human and infrastructural losses, killing over 200,000 people and destroying significant portions of public infrastructure, overwhelming already fragile institutions (PAHO, 2022).

Although climate change has not been formally recognized as a Security Council mandate item in Haiti's case, the link between environmental risk and instability remains relevant in broader peace and security discussions.

Most recently, the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021 created a significant power vacuum and further weakened already fragile institutions. This broader historical pattern of institutional fragility, limited state authority, and recurring crises forms the structural background to Haiti's current security situation. (Dupain et al., 2021).

### ***International Actions and Multilateral Involvement***

The international community has been involved in Haiti for several decades through peacekeeping operations, political missions, sanctions, development assistance, and humanitarian support. The United Nations has played a central role in this involvement.

From 2010 to 2020, the United States, through USAID, provided nearly \$2.3 billion in funding for reconstruction and development efforts in Haiti (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2021). In 2025, Canada announced an additional \$60 million during the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Week to support multilateral stabilization initiatives, including the Multinational Security Support mission aimed at addressing gang violence (Global Affairs Canada, 2025). That same year, the European Union disbursed €19.5 million in budget support to strengthen Haiti's capacity to deliver essential services and promote macroeconomic stability (Directorate-General for International Partnerships, 2025), while France contributed €16.5 million to the €40 million raised by the UN in 2024. Beyond financial assistance, support has also taken social forms, particularly through Canada's reception of Haitian refugees, who now represent a significant minority in Quebec.

The active involvement of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council (SC), dates back to 2004, when it authorized the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) through Resolution 1542 (2004) (United Nations Security Council, 2004). Established after the 2004 political crisis, MINUSTAH (2004–2017) aimed to support political stability, improve security conditions, and strengthen state institutions. The mission helped reduce certain forms of violence and supported electoral processes, but it was also criticized for failing to build lasting institutional capacity. Over time, Haiti became a case in which international presence and cooperation formed a central pillar of crisis management, although MINUSTAH's legacy remains controversial due to allegations of misconduct and responsibility for introducing cholera (United Nations Security Council, 2004; United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 2024).

This approach reached its culmination in 2017, following the closure of MINUSTAH, with the intention on the part of the SC to establish a strategy of action with a greater emphasis on political components and, especially, on Haiti's ability to build institutions as a means of stability (Security Council, 2019). Following MINUSTAH's withdrawal, the UN deployed smaller political missions focused on governance rather than peacekeeping, including MINUJUSTH (2017–2019) and the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), established in 2019 through resolution S/RES/2476 (2019), reflecting the shift toward political accompaniment, the rule of law, and human rights (Security Council, 2019). However, Haiti's political system experienced multiple forms of deterioration, which severely hindered the transition toward a system of democratic governance (Freedom House, 2025).

Due to the lack of presence of authorities and institutions capable of preserving public order, Haiti experienced the formation and expansion of armed groups throughout the country, particularly in the Port-au-Prince region. This led the SC in 2022 to establish a sanctions regime on Haiti through resolution S/RES/2653 (2022), targeting individuals and entities that posed a risk to the country's peace, stability, and security (Security Council, 2022). As gang violence expanded, the United Nations Security Council adopted targeted sanctions, including asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo aimed at cutting access to weapons and funds (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2692).

### ***Power Structures and Political Dynamics***

Haiti is currently governed by Alix Didier Fils-Aimé under a Transitional Presidential Council established in 2024 following the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, in addition to the escalating violence and coordinated attacks made by armed coalitions (UN Security Council, 2024). Over the past decade, Haiti's criminal landscape has changed significantly as gangs that once operated as small, neighborhood-based groups have consolidated into larger criminal coalitions that now control substantial portions of the country, including 80% - 90% of Port-au-Prince. The country currently lacks a functioning elected parliament, and national elections remain pending, which has significantly weakened institutional legitimacy and constitutional continuity. Although executive authority is exercised by the Transitional Council, effective territorial control remains highly divided. The armed groups dominate key transport and supply routes, extort commerce, and exert strong influence over the national economy. Their access to military-grade weapons enables coordinated violence against state institutions and civilians, while their control of major access routes to the capital allows them to regulate movement, generate revenue through extortion, and sustain their territorial dominance (*Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti*, n.d.). As a result, sovereignty exists in formal legal terms, but its practical implementation is very limited.

The most visible and devastating driver of the crisis is widespread armed gang violence. Haiti's major urban centers, especially Port-au-Prince, are dominated by powerful gangs that control neighborhoods, markets, and transportation routes. These groups operate like territorial militias, using kidnappings, extortion, and mass violence to finance themselves.

By mid-2025, armed gangs had consolidated control over up to 90 % of Port-au-Prince, forcing citizens into displacement camps and turning schools, churches, and sports complexes into shelters

International actors continue to influence Haiti's political trajectory. The United Nations, via the Security Council in 2023, authorized the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission through Resolution 2699 (2023) to assist the Haitian National Police in restoring stability (Security Council, 2023). Nevertheless, structural obstacles to institutional stability include limited fiscal capacity, corruption, weak judicial independence, political fragmentation, and delayed electoral organization; therefore, without credible elections and reform of judicial and policing institutions, governance consolidation remains uncertain (World Bank, 2024).

## ***Demographic Overview***

Haiti's population is estimated at approximately 11.7 million people, with a median age under 25 years, reflecting a notably young demographic structure. Hence, there is a high levels of youth unemployment and limited formal economic opportunities, which ends up contributing to social vulnerability and increasing risk of gang recruitment (World Bank, 2024).

On population concentration, most of the population is located in urban regions near the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, increasing instability. In addition, a large segment of the population resides in informal settlements with limited access to sanitation, electricity, and healthcare services (IOM, 2022). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), levels of internal displacement reached historic highs in 2024 and 2025 due to gang violence and insecurity (IDMC, 2024).

Mass emigration has also increased, particularly toward the United States and the Dominican Republic, creating regional humanitarian and migration management challenges. Also, procedures such as deportations and irregular migration trends complicate reintegration and social stability inside Haiti (IOM, 2024).

Another key component to understanding the country's instability is recognizing how the impact of natural disasters increased demographic vulnerability. The 2010 earthquake and subsequent hurricanes caused severe infrastructure destruction and long-term displacement effects, causing an increase in security crises and humanitarian emergencies that overlap and reinforce one another (PanAmerican Health Organization, 2011).

## ***The Social Aspect***

Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with high indexes of multilevel poverty and limited public services. In addition, income inequality, food insecurity, and limited healthcare access contribute to chronic social fragility (Council on Foreign Relations, 2025). Armed gangs now operate as territorial authorities in several neighborhoods, controlling transportation corridors, fuel distribution, and commercial routes, and through extortion systems and coercive control, they generate revenue and exert social influence, making it difficult to identify the distinctions between organized crime and *de facto* governance structures (International Crisis Group, 2025).

Public trust in national institutions remains extremely low, as surveys and international governance assessments indicate declining confidence in state authorities due to the government's inability to contain violence and ensure basic security. This context impacts daily life logistics, as in some cases schools close due to insecurity, supply chains are disrupted, and kidnappings remain widespread; and even though Civil society organizations and religious institutions continue to provide humanitarian assistance and community mediation, their capacity is limited (International Crisis Group, 2025).

## ***Unregulated Arms Trade and Its Role in Haiti's Gang Violence***

The unregulated arms trade is a major driver of gang violence in Haiti, enabling systematic human rights abuses and weakening state authority. Although precise figures are unavailable, experts estimate that roughly 600,000 firearms are in circulation. Furthermore, despite the establishment of a targeted sanctions regime under Resolution 2653 (2022), arms

trafficking and diversion remain persistent concerns (Security Council, 2022). This volume of weapons gives gangs the firepower to dominate neighborhoods, intimidate civilians, and overwhelm law enforcement. (Amnesty International, 2026)<sup>1</sup>. In this context, the Haitian National Police faces numerous operational limitations, including staffing shortages, resource constraints, and insufficient equipment.

Gangs obtain weapons through two main channels. The first is diversion from government stockpiles, including theft and loss due to weak controls. The second is international smuggling, which continues despite the 2023 ban on firearm imports, except for weapons designated for the Haitian government or United Nations-authorized security forces. Haiti's geographic proximity to the United States, where gun acquisition is relatively easy due to permissive regulations, makes illicit trafficking particularly feasible. Once weapons enter the country, they circulate through informal networks that are difficult to trace or disrupt (Amnesty International, 2026).

The situation in Haiti is not only a domestic crisis but also a matter of international peace and security that falls within the mandate of the Security Council. The collapse of state authority, expansion of heavily armed criminal groups, and deterioration of public order have created conditions that facilitate transnational organized crime, illicit arms trafficking, and regional instability. Large-scale displacement and irregular migration flows toward neighboring states and North America have generated humanitarian and political pressures across the region. Additionally, Haiti's proximity to major maritime routes and its vulnerability to environmental disasters increase the risk of broader security and humanitarian emergencies. In this context, the Haitian crisis represents a multidimensional threat that extends beyond national borders, requiring coordinated international action to restore stability, strengthen governance, and prevent further regional destabilization.

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<sup>1</sup> Amnesty International. (2026, January 5). *Gang violence in Haiti - Amnesty International*. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/projects/gang-violence-in-haiti/>

## Guiding Questions

1. What is the position of the delegation you represent regarding the political and humanitarian situation in Haiti? Has your country voted on, contributed to, or spoken out about any SC resolutions, international missions, or sanctions related to Haiti?
2. Who are the main actors shaping the crisis in Haiti today and what are their interests, capacities, and disagreements with each other?
3. How should the international community confront the violence of non-state armed groups in Haiti while avoiding further harm to civilians and preserving humanitarian access?
4. Which specific instruments can the Security Council use in Haiti and what political and legal constraints, including the risk of a veto, limit their use?
5. What is the mandate, current performance, and exit strategy of the international security mission in Haiti? What conditions would need to be met for it to be considered a success and what happens if they are not?
6. How can the Security Council design its response to Haiti so that protecting children, women, displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups is not just stated as a goal but built into the actual operational priorities of any mandate?
7. How can the SC promote accountability for serious crimes and human rights violations committed in Haiti and what role can transitional justice mechanisms play in building lasting peace?
8. What role should regional organizations or neighboring states play alongside the SC in addressing the crisis, and how can the Council support regional leadership rather than replace it?
9. How can short-term security measures in Haiti be linked to long-term political solutions?
10. Who should bear the financial and political responsibility for the international response in Haiti, and how can the SC build the broadest possible coalition while genuinely respecting Haitian sovereignty and avoiding long-term dependency on external actors?

## **Topic B. Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and Risks for Peace and International Security**

### ***Historical background***

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a set of technologies that empowers computers to learn, reason, and perform a variety of advanced tasks in ways that used to require human intelligence. AI started as a field of study in 1956 during the Dartmouth Conference, where researchers such as John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky proposed that machines could simulate aspects of human intelligence (McCarthy et al., 1956). From its beginnings, AI was mainly an academic discipline, in which research focused on symbolic reasoning, problem solving, and basic forms of automation. Its applications were largely civilian, including data processing, translation systems, and early robotics, leading to AI not being perceived as a security concern.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the field began to evolve toward what is known as machine learning, which refers to systems capable of identifying patterns in data and improving their performance without being programmed step by step for every task (Russell & Norvig, 2010). These developments were made possible by continued improvements in computing power and digital storage. Even so, artificial intelligence continued to be understood primarily as a commercial and research tool rather than a strategic technology.

From the 2010s onwards, AI systems became deeply integrated into global economic and digital infrastructures. Governments and private companies began using AI for large-scale data analysis, logistics, and automation, while states started recognizing AI's potential for national security. AI started being used in intelligence analysis, surveillance systems, cybersecurity, and military planning. This marked a turning point: AI was no longer only a civilian technology but a dual-use tool with both peaceful and military applications (Tuvdendarjaa, 2025). Even if not formally classified as a dual-use technology, this expression refers to the aspect that AI applications have both legitimate and malicious uses.

As AI capabilities expanded, so did its role in conflict prevention and crisis management. International organizations, including the United Nations, began exploring how AI could support early warning systems by analyzing satellite imagery, economic data, climate indicators, and social media trends to anticipate humanitarian crises, mass displacement, or outbreaks of violence. These tools also started to support disaster response by improving logistics and coordination during emergencies (Tuvdendarjaa, 2025). Simultaneously, AI gained a growing role in defensive security. Machine-learning systems were developed to identify cyberattacks in real time and to safeguard critical infrastructure, including energy networks, hospitals, financial systems, and transportation services. As cyber threats became more sophisticated, AI tools proved increasingly essential for strengthening resilience and enabling rapid responses to digital attacks (Araya & King, 2022).

As AI became more present in military systems and cyber operations, discussions within international institutions began to grow. In 2014, debates on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems started under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons at the United Nations (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2014). These talks focused on weapons capable of selecting and engaging targets without direct human control and

although no binding agreement resulted, they represented an early recognition that autonomous technologies could affect international peace and security. In the years that followed, several major powers began identifying AI as a key element of their defense and national security strategies (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2020).

This shift moved the debate beyond technical experts into political and diplomatic arenas. Within the United Nations system, AI became increasingly linked to discussions on cybersecurity and global stability, and in 2024 and 2025, the Security Council held debates on these issues (United Nations Security Council, 2025). In December 2025, Slovenia, France, Denmark, and Greece issued a joint statement addressing AI and its implications for international peace (Pytlak, 2026). Although it did not create new legal obligations, it reaffirmed that AI must be used in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, confirming its place within global security discussions.

### ***AI in the Military Aspect***

Artificial intelligence has become embedded in military and intelligence structures, largely because of its capacity to process enormous volumes of data and automate complex analytical tasks. One of the most visible applications of AI in defense is the development of unmanned and autonomous systems. These range from drones to autonomous ground and naval platforms, some of which are capable of operating with limited or no direct human supervision. These machines can function in hazardous or inaccessible environments, reacting quicker than human operators, and carrying out missions without exposing soldiers to risk, aiming to reduce military casualties (Daxhelet & FINABEL, 2023).

While this can aid military forces, at the same time, the growing incorporation of AI into military capabilities, critical infrastructure, communication systems, and global economic networks has created new vulnerabilities. AI-enabled cyber operations may present failures in automated decision-making systems, and the exploitation of these technologies by non-state actors poses inherently transnational security risks. Disruptions to energy systems, financial markets, or defense-related communications can generate cascading effects, heightening the likelihood of miscalculation, escalation, or interstate confrontation (Puscas et al., 2022)

### ***State actions***

The European Parliament has established clear AI rules by banning applications that directly threaten fundamental rights. Prohibiting the uses that include biometric categorization based on sensitive characteristics, mass scraping of facial images to create recognition databases, and any AI systems designed to manipulate human behavior or exploit individual vulnerabilities emphasizing the commitment to human dignity and personal autonomy. In law enforcement, biometric identification is generally prohibited and allowed only in exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances. Any use must be limited in time and geographic scope and subject to prior judicial or administrative authorization, such as searching for a missing person or preventing a terrorist attack. Uses carried out after the fact are classified as high risk and require judicial approval linked to a specific criminal offense, reinforcing that surveillance technologies must remain the exception rather than the norm (*Artificial Intelligence Act: MEPs Adopt Landmark Law | News | European Parliament*, n.d.).

Countries such as the United States have incorporated AI into defense planning through initiatives aimed at maintaining technological superiority and improving decision-making capabilities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023). China has emphasized

“civil–military fusion,” integrating civilian technological innovation with defense modernization to strengthen national security capabilities (Kania, 2019). Both countries view AI as a decisive factor in future strategic competition.

At the normative level, governance mechanisms have struggled to keep pace with technological change. Existing arms control frameworks and international humanitarian law were drafted long before the emergence of autonomous weapon systems or AI-driven cyber operations. Since 2014, discussions on lethal autonomous weapon systems have taken place within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons at the United Nations in Geneva (UNODA, 2014). Although these debates have not yet produced a binding treaty, they have focused on maintaining meaningful human control over the use of force.

### ***AI in the Modern Era***

The United Nations Secretary General has also addressed these concerns, as in 2018 and 2021, he warned about the risks of weapons that can select and engage targets without human intervention and called for international regulation (United Nations, 2021). More recently, in 2023, the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/78/265 on artificial intelligence, recognizing both its benefits and its potential risks for international stability (United Nations, 2024).

AI is currently shaping warfare across multiple domains. AI systems are used to generate strike recommendations and process large volumes of data, increasing operational speed but raising concerns about proportionality and excessive reliance on automated outputs. Other applications include databases that identify individuals linked to armed groups, which risk misidentification and violations of the principle of distinction when data are biased or incomplete (“AI In Conflict: Keeping Humanity in Control,” 2025).

AI has reshaped the information environment. Generative AI enables realistic fake content, such as deep fakes, which can be used in disinformation, election interference, and influence operations, raising concerns about political stability and public trust. As AI becomes more integrated into defense, communication, and economic systems, new vulnerabilities have appeared, including cyberattacks, system failures, and misuse by non-state actors (Puscas, 2023).

These practices weaken public trust, distort democratic processes, and undermine political legitimacy, increasing the risk of internal instability that may extend beyond national borders and contribute to regional or international tensions (Puscas et al., 2022).

### ***Conclusion***

Existing arms control regimes and international humanitarian law were originally designed for conventional weapons and do not explicitly regulate autonomous weapon systems. The use of AI in counterterrorism operations must balance security objectives with protections for privacy, due process, and non-discrimination. In addition, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare provides a useful reference for understanding how existing legal norms apply to cyber operations, including those enhanced by artificial intelligence. AI-enabled cyber operations are leading to ongoing interpretive and governance gaps (Coco, 2025). Although multilateral discussions at the United Nations, particularly within the CCW framework and General Assembly resolutions, are addressing these challenges, regulatory progress has been limited by geopolitical competition and divergent state interests (Le Poidevin, 2025). Taken together, these developments confirm

that artificial intelligence has become a structural factor in contemporary security dynamics rather than a purely technical innovation. Its dual-use character requires careful governance and coordinated international responses to mitigate destabilizing effects and to safeguard international peace and security. Today, AI is a central issue in international security, seen as both a tool for peace and a source of serious global risks.

### **Guiding Questions**

1. What is the official position of the delegation you represent on the development and use of artificial intelligence in security and defense? Has your country voted on any relevant UN resolutions, published a national AI strategy for military use, or taken a public stance on autonomous weapons?
2. Who are the main blocs and actors shaping the AI and security debate at the UN and what are their fundamental disagreements about how AI should be governed?
3. Through which specific pathways does AI threaten international peace and security (such as lethal autonomous weapons, AI-enhanced cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, or the risk of accidental escalation between nuclear powers) and which does your country consider most urgent?
4. How can the Security Council address the risk of an AI-driven arms race, given the profound technological gap between states that develop and export AI and those that do not? What obligations, if any, do technologically advanced states have toward others?
5. To what extent do existing frameworks (International Humanitarian Law, the UN Charter, and human rights law) already apply to AI-enabled weapons systems? Where are the legal gaps, and does your country believe new binding norms or treaties are necessary, or that existing law is sufficient?
6. How can the Security Council protect human rights and privacy against AI-enabled mass surveillance, targeting systems, and profiling, without blocking the legitimate use of AI?
7. What concrete measures can states take to prevent AI from being used for political manipulation, large-scale disinformation, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and how can the SC enforce or incentivize compliance, particularly against non-state actors?
8. What existing UN bodies, agreements, or mechanisms currently govern AI in security contexts, and what is missing? Is the Security Council the right body to lead on this, or should it defer to the General Assembly, specialized agencies, or a new dedicated institution?

9. Given the deep divisions among Security Council members, particularly among the P5, on how to regulate artificial intelligence in security and defense, what realistic path exists toward a SC resolution on this topic, and what minimum common ground could survive the threat of a veto?
  
10. What specific and actionable measures could the Security Council include in a resolution on AI and international security, and which of these is your country prepared to support?

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